

The Arts and Bureaucracy

- *An International Comparative Study on Structure of Bureaucracy in the Arts*

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Summer 2002

Funded by the Suntory Foundation

To understand the cultural politics of a country, one must first understand its political culture¹. Arts management, on the other hand, cannot avoid ignoring the social regulations and cultural politics of the state. When approaching the subjects of cultural policy and arts management, or the government involvement in the arts, one of major questions must be: who involve in its policy-making and decision-making and how they function.

Here these who are responsible to policy-making and decision-making, are temporarily called as “*administrator*”. This terminology is adapted from Wolferen, who described and criticised Japan’s particular features of government and bureaucracy², but the concept with “*administrator*” is not only applicable to Japan but also other countries when we discuss about policy-making and decision-making in the arts. “*Administrators*” are usually “*bureaucrats*”, however, administrators in the arts are not only bureaucrats - in narrow sense - public officials or civil servants. Arts managers and artists, who involve in policy-making and decision-making, also become “*administrators*”. This is a feature of policy-making and decision-making in public administration of the arts, which do not have any absolute truth or value.

Needless to say, national government officials and local government officials work for the public interests in the framework of the Government Officials Regulations respectively. However, arts managers and artists are in principle not bureaucrats, and they change their nature by their employment or given task or mission. After completion of their task or mission, they go back to their original professions and involve in the survival game of practices in the arts.

Arts world has been weaved and textured by various aspects, and direction of the arts in the society is defined by it. However, the world of bureaucracy that the arts are located within is not static; changing conceptions about the roles of the arts and the relationship of governments with them are continually present³.

The aim of the paper is to clarify the problems with bureaucracy in the arts and its social background and system. Firstly France and Britain, whose systems are completely different from each other, will be examined, and then the paper discusses Japan and Sweden. The paper will be a basis for further study for international

comparison between Japan and Sweden in term of the problems with bureaucracy in the arts. In this paper, the discussions will be focused on administrators in national government level - local government issues will be discussed in the other paper.

A main question is that; “who are administrators?” And it leads to another question that; whether or not administrators are defined by political and social climates rather than artistic context.

The research project is initiated by Dr. Haukur F. Hannesson and the author of the paper, with the working title of “the Arts and Bureaucracy”, a comparative study between Japan and Sweden”. The research intends to examine how public administration in Japan and Sweden influence the shape and implementation of cultural policy in these two countries. The research project is partially funded by the Suntory Foundation, and involves, apart from the two researchers mentioned above, also other researchers from the two countries.

1 4 PROTOTYPES OF CULTURAL POLICY

Cultural policy cannot be measured by the amount of government expenditures for the arts. Harry Hilmann Chartland, a Canadian cultural economist, tried to classify cultural policy, in other word, the state involvement in the arts by its objective and role. The state takes on different roles, which can be classified as “facilitator”, “patron”, “architect”, and “engineer”⁴.

The prototype is not comprehensive, and has been criticised occasionally. However, it is useful for the paper to clarify the interaction between “administrators” and arts management practices.

In the “facilitator” model, the government involvement in the arts is characterised by granting tax concessions for individuals and corporations making donations and sponsorship in support of artists or arts organisations. It is to say that, except for tax concession system, the economic survival of artists or arts organisations is left to individual’s or organisation’s ability to generate funds commercially in a free market⁵. The decision-making is left to the donors, in principle. This prototype could be found in the United States, however before the establishment of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA). But the government involvement of the arts in the United States is still characterised by this. In this, ability of arts management professionals is measured by how much they could generate the fund with sustainable development rather than how much they could produce high standard artistic products. As a result, organisation structure of arts organisations corresponds to this context, arts organisations in the United States usually have more staff in number in development or fund-raising sections than those in the other countries.

In this model, the administrators as well as assessors are “*citizens*”. The model depends on good common and aesthetic senses that citizens do not subsidise arts organisations with poor quality although have good fund-raising skills.

On the other hand, the model of “*engineer*” is characterised by the state’s ownership of both arts organisations and the promotion bodies. The state supports the arts that meet the political requirement of the authorities⁶. The state supports the arts that meet the political requirements of the authorities⁷. The authorities and their policies are governed, in order to achieve their political goal by the bureaucrats. In principle, the arts and arts management do not ensure their independence from the state politics, artists and arts managers are protected and heavily restricted as elite bureaucrats.

The prototype of this model was the pre 1989 communist Europe, and has been lost. However, even in the western countries, we have sometimes seen that the arts are utilised for political purpose - the political will using the arts in society with capitalism may lead to more difficult problem, because in capitalist society most artists status and works are not usually guaranteed at all. It means that the political will may be achieved by the expense of artists.

In this paper, the author think there is no need to go into details about these two prototypes. Because these two are completely different from the states involvement of the arts in Japan and Sweden. However, the rest two are very important for my discussion. Both countries have both “patron” and “architect” in their systems at the same time. Although Japan is a typical bureaucratic state, but at the same time, has been following the manner with “patron” state. On the other hand, because of “two tier system”, Sweden has been enjoying them in parallel.

After examining France and Britain, as prototypes of “architect” and “patron”, the paper will focus on Japan, in comparison with Sweden.

2 ARCHITECT - POWER NATION OF ARTS OWNED BY BUREAUCRACTS

The “Architect” model, the state involves in the arts through their own organ, a ministry. The role and power of the civil servants - the bureaucrats - are usually defined by the power relationship between the politicians (parliaments) and the ministry, in the central government of the state. In France, a prototype country for “architect” model, the role of the Ministry of Culture is decisive⁸. Within the budget allocated to it by the government it is the Ministry which draws up its concrete projects and general objectives⁹. Parliament, on the other hand, only plays a secondary role in drawing up cultural policy¹⁰. It is to say that the civil servants working for the ministry are also involving the policy-making as well as decision-making. From this description, we could assume the power of the bureaucrats is rather strong, although the strong charismatic leadership of the Minister of Culture, such as Andre Marlow and Jack Lang, is known.

The characteristic structure of French cultural policy lies in an interaction between professional elitist bureaucrats who are independent from the parliament and the Minister as charismatic leader.

It is important to mention that in France, the Government and the Parliament is separable. Under de Gaulle administration, the Fifth Republic revised its constitution, and the constitution prohibited no minister can hold the post as a member of the parliament. It is to say that the power of the members of the parliament is relatively low, and there is a certain distance from the politics.

The following case can be a testimony illustrating the power of the bureaucrats in France.

A civil servant’s name is memorised in the history. Jeanne Laurent, a civil servant for the Ministry of Education, in 1940s, immortalised herself as the “Mother of Theatre Decentralisation”¹¹ - it is not easy to find out this kind of case in another countries.

Prior to well-known Marlow’s regime, she appointed Jean Vilar as director for the Avignon Festival and the National Popular Theatre (*Theatre National Populaire*), and set up a scheme for subsidising regional theatre, National Dramatic Centres (*Centres Dramatiques Nationaux*)¹². Laurent opened the way for the civil servant committing the artistic activities directly, and could be regarded herself as the first cultural bureaucrat in France, although she was too early pioneer and paid herself a high cost - she was removed from the position in 1951¹³. In the period of the Marlow’s regime, the “real” cultural bureaucrats appeared one after another, followed her example¹⁴. A critical historian, Fumaroli judged her qualification as a bureaucrat, as follows

“In many aspects, she was a exemplary French bureaucrat - the very type of bureaucrat that for a long time foreigners have reasonably envied...Capable, unselfish, modest, and non-ambitious in nature, she was not a dull bureaucrat.”¹⁵

2-1 PUBLIC SERVANTS - THEIR NATURES AND POWER.

In post-war France, an image of “exemplary French bureaucrat” has been representing by graduates of Ecole Nationale d’Administration, which was established in 1946. The graduates of ENA occupy senior posts of most ministries.

There are four basis categories of civil servants in France, and each category is also classified by ranks. The category A is senior administrative civil servants who are recruited from graduates ENA, IRA and so on. 28% of civil servants is categorised in this highest category¹⁶.

About the upper 15% of ENA graduates usually obtain their positions at “Grandes ecoles” – major three government organs.

French Civil Servant System (As of January 1988)

	Qualification	Tasks	Percentage
Category A	University Graduate	Planning, Administration, Control	28
Category B	Baccalureat	Clerk	31.8
Category C	Compulsory education & technical qualification	Typist, Driver and other practical tasks.	34.2
Category D	Compulsory education	Guard, Caretaker and so on.	6.0

In the field of arts, the Ministry of Culture and Communications employs 21,450 people directly, within the Ministry and national facilities and institutions throughout the nation (as of 1997). As a matter of fact, certain of these establishments operate as public companies, enjoying a degree of autonomy under the responsibility of a board of directors, but in the main they are financially dependent upon the ministry, which appoints their directors¹⁷. The staff working for the establishments such as regional national theatre, are given civil servant status. In this context, the Minister of Culture and bureaucrats at the Ministry of Culture define defines cultural lives in France. In order to know view and influence of the French bureaucrats, Safran discusses about the natures and power of French bureaucrats.

Interest-group influence is limited by several factors: the ego of civil servants, which does not easily lend itself to the notion that non-professional outsiders can make significant contributions to administrative decisions; the unequal representation of social sectors; and the principle of central government responsibility and supervision (*tutelle*), which permits civil servants to restrict the parameters of consultative input. Moreover, a committee’s recommendations may be ignored by the civil servants (even in cases where consultation is obligatory), may merely provide the façade of public participation, or may be cited to promote unpopular regulations, thus permitting the civil servants to escape the blame for these¹⁸.

It is important to consider that the description is written by a researcher in the United States where there is a completely different system from France. Of course, even French public civil service is not unlimited in its power, and civil servants can administer only on the basis of laws¹⁹. However, the following description illustrates strong power of bureaucracy in the arts in France.

Those responsible for cultural policy in France are not assisted by any decision-making body made up of representatives of groups from the world of culture: creators, people who run profit-making or non-profit associations, teachers, amateurs, fans, company managers, workers²⁰.

Two descriptions clarify decision-makings are not open to professional in arts creation, and are made by the bureaucrats within the Ministry of Culture. In the field of arts, which depend on individual value and taste, a point should be discussed is whether or not the bureaucrats understand the arts and the artists. Of course their given tasks and missions are more comprehensive, and should not be judged by their knowledge of the arts. At the same time, it is not the matter of the extent knowing the arts. As the Rockefeller Panel Report defined, it depends on whether or not one has an attitude as a continuing student of the arts²¹. However, these points cannot be verified scientifically - discussions around the arts are often no more than idealism. In this sense, it is important to measure by whether or not there is a consensus among the arts world.

Qualifications of bureaucrats, to some extent, may be defined by what kind of education and training they had. How much viewpoints of/for the arts are included in their education and training?

According to Safran, the Curriculum of ENA provides for a unique combination of the practical and theoretical.

The three-year program begins with a year of work in an administrative office, often in the provinces. The second year is devoted to academic study in Paris. The third year consists of further on-the-job training in the particular ministry that the student hopes to enter²².

What the curriculum clarifies is future elite bureaucrats might not have knowledge of the arts practice, but through their on-the-job training and academic study, they learn their tasks and missions. This requires a premise for functioning the system precisely that decision which ministry each graduate enters is made by the graduate himself/herself - each graduate declare a ministry he or she hopes to enter in the order of merit, and there is no right for each ministry to select or refuse their declaration²³.

In 1998, Institute Superior de Management Culturel, where provides training for senior management staff in the arts and culture field, was established by the initiative of the Ministry of Culture. This one-year post-graduate management course aims to provide training for small number of highly qualified applicant - resembling training given at the ENA²⁴.

There is no data available about the graduate - what kind of posts they have had, but it must be clarified in further study.

In France, arts managers and artists who work for national institutions on a full-time basis are given civil servant status by the Ministry of Culture. It can be said that to some extent their existence would support the lack of practicality of senior bureaucrats in term of their decision-making. However, needless to say, the practitioners cannot have senior posts at the Ministry. In this sense, for arts practitioners, it is easier to be the Minister of Culture rather than to sit senior post at the Ministry.

2-2 ARTISTS BEING CIVIL SERVANTS

Essentially, artists are not policy-makers and decision-makers in term of politics and economics of the organisation and the state. However, in France, it is not unusual that an artist who is contracted with the Ministry of Culture change its feature to civil servant who is responsible to administer large scale of national institution. Is this the best choice for artist? Or must non-artistic person - civil servant -, on the other hand, be responsible?

Jean Vilar was appointed as a director at the Theatre Nationale Populaire in 1951 and resigned the post in 1963. This is an example, which an artist had worked as a top civil servant of a national institution for a long period. Vilar's belief was known that theatre needed to be seen as a public service, as necessary to the well-being of a

community as gas, water or electricity²⁵, and he wanted to liberate theatre from bourgeois. This type of spirited theatre practitioner must have been useful for the purpose of public administration of senior civil servants. Cheap price of ticket, association of the friends of the TNP, free bus service...he introduced new theatre management and expanded its audience. However, he faced many problems during his terms at TNP. Especially, Sartre's severe criticism on the lack of new writing at its programme and the audience composition is widely known. As a matter of fact, Sartre's demand was no more than idealism and was impossible when considering the scale of theatre and funding system. Vilar's resign in 1963 was caused by his action appealing insufficient to achieve his great mission from the government. My own assumption is, if Vilar were not theatre practitioner, but civil servant or professional art manager, he might have created a justification ignoring any criticism and might have stayed at his position for more than his terms.

There are some examples shifting "responsibility" in administration from artist to civil servant. Affirmative bibliographies are usually written by senior bureaucrats²⁶. On the other hand, un-affirmative is usually written by the side of arts organisation or artist. However, there is an exception. "La Comedie-Francaise" by Devaux describes the history of a famous national theatre with artists autonomy, and criticises the political intervention by Andre Marlow, the Minister of Culture. Devaux himself was a senior bureaucrat of the Ministry of Culture. Mollard asks that; "is it reasonable that an artist would involve in administrative problems for a long period?"²⁷, and on the other hand, Devaux criticises that;

"il faut s'interroger sur les lignes directrices retenues par les govuveernants a l'egard de la politique a mener pur la Comedie-Francaise."²⁸

These publications tell us that there is no a concrete answer on who should run large scale of national institutions even among senior bureaucrats. At the same time, these two show us their strong sense of missions and affection for artists and the arts. They duly recognise themselves to have responsibility to protect artists and the arts from non-cultural influence of finance and politics.

3 PATRON - SPECIALISTS BEING ARTS BUREAUCRATS

Although "patron" is a term associated with traditional arts supports from aristocracy and bourgeois, Britain, a prototype of modern "patron" state is known as a state, which did not have the tradition supporting the arts. Minihan precisely describes the process, arguments and trial-and-errors of Britain changing from laissez-faire with puritanical nature to the Welfare State with supporting the arts with notion of the patron²⁹. It is interesting that Britain chose to be a patron state through discussions and arguments rather than because of tradition. The "administrators" in Britain are requested to work for realisation of a consensus the long discussions and arguments reached.

In Britain, the power of "the Minister" is stronger than the others. In other words, the Secretary of the State as a member of cabinet as well as a member of parliament owes solo responsibility. And then under the responsibility of the Secretary of the State, politically neutral bureaucrats work.

However, the "Patron State" does not consist of civil servants under the Ministries. Pick argues that; "Bureaucrats cannot recognise or control genius, creativity, and they fear criticism, but economic forces they can control³⁰". This is an explanation that civil servants in Britain do not touch any value-judgement in the arts, except with financial aspect. Here there is a common understanding and consensus that private arts activities must not be censored by politicians and should not be swayed by the change of politics. In addition to this, it is important to note, according to Ridley, there is "the philosophy that life was a serious business and that leisure should be spend in morally uplifting ways³¹." In the process of establishment of the Welfare State, the state involvement in the arts was accelerated, and the state established a system subsidising the arts with justification of using

taxpayers' money, and with protecting artistic autonomy. The system is called as “*arm's length principle*”. Arm's length has been applied to the other sector, such as education and media, and established quasi-autonomous governmental organisations (Quangos), which are independent from politics.

3-1 THE STRUCTURE OF “ARM'S LENGTH PRINCIPLE

The “arm's length principle” for the arts was first enunciated in the 1970s, but was actually a long-standing feature of the quango form of administration, allowing Ministers to avoid direct intervention in policy areas whilst still ensuring that public involvement took place in the administration, management and provision of politically desired policies³².

The Principle was firstly invented and devised by H.A.L. Fisher, who established the University Grants Committee as an un-elected body of university men, appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on whose advice the government of the day asked Parliament each year to vote money for distribution, without strings, to each university³³. BBC and the British Council had followed this manner, and in post-war, the Arts Council of Great Britain, the first major funding body for the arts, was established as well.

The Arts Council members were appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and then from the 1965 reforms by the Prime Minister in both cases upon the advice of the Minister of Education and the Secretary of Scotland³⁴. The Council in turn appoints expert panels on each art form, though these are usually chaired by a ministerially appointed full member of the Arts Council³⁵, the staff working under the Arts Council members were not civil servants, but qualified specialists who are from practical arts world, such as artists, arts administrators and academics. In British sense, they are called ‘arts bureaucrats’. Criticism by Pick was directed to mainly arts bureaucrats working at the Arts Council of Great Britain rather than the ‘original’ bureaucrats³⁶.

The principle functions to avoid undue concentration of power and conflict of interest³⁷ and has been applied to a wide range of public affairs in Western nations, with some variations - both Sweden's light control³⁸, and Japan's own interpretation are my focal points.

With regard of the benefits of the arm's length principle as a safeguard, R. Fisher sort out as follows;

1. Politicians or their servants setting themselves up as arbiters of cultural taste;
2. the political manipulation of artists;
3. the deadening effect of officially-approved art;
4. the ever-present danger of censorship.³⁹

The arm's length principle itself has been a major subject for argument in the arts in Britain.

Although usually so far reference has been made only to decisions being taken at arm's length from government and political bureaucracies, some suggest that, in acting as buffers between government and the arts, arts councils also operate at arm's length from the arts community if they choose to make grants to arts organisations / artists without strings attached⁴⁰. It is called as “Double Arm's Length” principle. It may be an ideal from arts organisations / artists, however, it is not acceptable for the arts bureaucrats because they are dealing with not only the arts but also the taxpayers' money - when the principle was firstly introduced into Japan, the interpretation emphasised this second arm rather than the first one.

Another argument is the notion of the principle is opposite to democracy. Needless to say, Britain has been enjoying the longest tradition as a “representative” democratic state. However, due to the arm's length bodies with expert panels, whose members not-representing not only any interested group or organisation, or politics but also the citizens, the decision-making process in the arts subsidy cannot be regarded as democratic. It is known that Hugh Jenkins, a Labour Minister for the Arts, 1974 - 1976, severely criticised

un-democratic decision-making system of the Arts Council of Great Britain, and attempted to reform it⁴¹. The discussions around the bureaucrats in the Britain have always been linked to the justification of the existence of the Arts Councils and their way of working. Pick points out as follows.

Although the old “arm’s length principle” supposedly protected artists from elected politicians, it did not always protect them from the arts bureaucrats....To some it always seemed that the arm’s length principle gave freedom only to the arts bureaucrats - they were free of direct government interference, and free to behave as they wishes towards their clients⁴².

Lord Redcliffe-Maud, on the other hand, insists that, a convention has been established over the years that in arts patronage neither the politician nor the bureaucrat knows best⁴³. There is a consensus, which has been admitting the existence of un-democratic arts council. However, as far as the author knows, in Britain, there has been no discussion about the independence from the industry. This must be very British notion based on their cultural and social background.

Britain had enjoyed its feature as the welfare state between 1944 and 1979 when the Thatcher administration was born. The creation of the welfare state was the greatest and the most enduringly popular of the achievements of the Labour governments⁴⁴. In the welfare state, it is usually understood that the strong centralised government administers whole public services. However, the Arts Council of Great Britain has been enjoying a different stance. It is also interesting that both the welfare state and the Arts Council of Great Britain were fruits at the same period.

In general, British “original” civil servants are expected their neutrality from politics. Also their amateur nature as generalists have been severely criticised. The “arts bureaucrats” supplement civil servants of generalists, and also function a safeguard for avoiding political intervention. However, there has no discussion about whether arts bureaucrats at the Arts Councils are politically neutral or not, except the Chairman and members of the Arts Councils, which are known as very political. It is interesting to note that, according to Dubin, the world of art is one in which neutrality is not expected⁴⁵.

3-2 ARTS COUNCILS AND ARTS BUREAUCRATS

Associated problems with arts bureaucrats are summarised that; the people who do not contract with the public as civil servants have the strong power in decision-making for financing the arts. They are experts, and because of their specialists nature some inclination may be caused by their own taste and value.

In the process of forming the Arts Council of Great Britain, John Meynard Keynes, the chairman and top arts bureaucrat, created a system of panel, which he and his taste could be reflected to all decision-makings.

In October 1942, there was an important constitutional development. Keynes informed the Council that after consultation with the President of the Board, it had been decided to set up panels for Music, Art and Drama. The original plan was that as chairman of CEMA he would be entitled to take the chair at all panel meetings, and that Dr Stanley Marchant, Sir Kenneth Clark, and Ivor Brown should serve as vice-chairmen of the Music, Art, and Drama Panels respectively. Keynes made it clear that decisions taken at Panel meetings would have the force of Council decisions, but major questions of policy would be referred that seemed desirable...Keynes was proposing a modification in the set-up...the Panel needed to met more frequently than he could spare time to attend: so it was agreed that in future they should meet under their vice-chairmen, and all their decisions of finance and major policy should

be referred to the Council for confirmation. This was a step in the direction of making the Panels purely advisory bodies...⁴⁶

Also some critical gaps in decisions between by the Advisory Panels and by the Councils have been known publicly. The following is the case of 1977 that Malcolm Griffiths, an established theatre director, contributed an article to theatre magazine, entitled “Drama Panel Game”. Griffith was a member of the Arts Council’s Touring Committee from 1971 to 1977, and of the Drama Panel in 1975 and 1976, serving on its Standards and Reassessments Committee, New Applications and Projects Committee, and New Writing Committee. He revealed not only the lack of a concrete policy among the organisation but also privileged conscious of arts council officers and they work for only their interests rather than the interest of the public or of the arts.

Last year, at a meeting of the touring committee we discussed at great length the many elements that go into touring, a whole range of things that have developed over the last six to eight years, which have been initiated from outside the Arts Council and which were not an Arts Council initiative at all: companies, new venues, new audience, new work, how this relates to Regional Arts Associations, how it relates to the Arts Council. After we had been talking about the actual relationship between the work and the audiences, the Finance Director came in and said, “Well, I don’t see what the argument is about. The Arts Council policy is to keep the buildings open”. Which was greeted with howls of laughter. Because the whole discussion of the touring committee had been just the opposite. The *reality* is just the opposite. A policy had been set and was perpetuated without regard to reality⁴⁷.

In correspondence with this article, Frank Marcus supported the points through describing his experience when he resigned the Drama Panel.

At the last meeting I attended I called out ‘Why are we here? We’re being used as rubber stamps!’ The officers of the Council looked aghast and ignored the outburst.

The crux of the matter is that here is a considerable amount of government money and here are any number of outstretched hand, clamouring for a share of it. The allocation of it requires value judgements. Who is to make the decisions, and what are to be the criteria?⁴⁸

This sort of criticism on the Arts Council exists a lot. A major problem with arm’s length type of arts council is that; as it enjoys solo power to allocate huge government money without any strings, it would be an “administrator” as well as an “employer” for subsidised arts organisations. In this sense, there must be some similarities in concept among France, Sweden and the other welfare states. The Arts Council and its officers are not responsible to the public and arts organisations as its clients, but are responsible to its Secretary of the State. However, its reality, as Griffiths writes, arts organisations seem to owe its responsibility.

In Britain, because of its traditional class hierarchy, there is a strict difference between elites and non-elites. Although Oxford and Cambridge have strong power in education, there is no national institution for educating and training elite civil servants only. For arts bureaucrats, there are many post-graduate educations on arts management or cultural policy. In particular, although the Department of Arts Policy and Management, the City University, has been providing education and training for arts administrators as a leading institution, at the same time, it has been known and criticised as a cradle for senior elitist arts bureaucrats. Ironically, a charismatic leader who launched and developed the course is Professor John Pick, who has been consistently criticising arts bureaucrats. It may be important to note that there is no subject around value judgement or humanities in its curriculum at the City University - except Arts Criticism course.

4 BETWEEN TWO PROTOTYPES - JAPAN

Japan has been known as a state led by a strong bureaucracy, and its systems have been imported various developed countries after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Its feature of the bureaucracy has been known as domination of “career” civil servants who graduated the Faculty of Law, the University of Tokyo.

Cultural policy in Japan may be classified in the prototype of “architect” represented by France because of the strong centralised bureaucracy, but at the same time, it has been admiring the “patron” state represented by Britain. It means that as a traditional bureaucratic state, Japan has been adhering its system, but at the same time, it has introduced decision-making system using experts panel whose members are independent from politics. Of course, here there is a strong regret for having controlled the arts and culture in the pre-war period⁴⁹.

In 1990, when the Japan Arts Fund (Geijutsu Bunka Shinko Kikin) was founded, the Agency for Cultural Affairs (Bunka-cho) insisted that this new fund would be administered with *arm's length principle*, and delegated its administration to Tokushuhōjin Nihon Geijutsu Bunka Shinkokai - *Tokushuhōjin* is an equivalent to quango in Britain. The organisation has its English name as “Japan Arts Council”, and administers not only the Fund but also the National Theatres. Many administrative staffs working for the Japan Arts Council are on loan from the Agency for Cultural Affairs and the Ministry of Education. In principle, arm's length principle intends to be independent from not only politics but also government bureaucracy, but Japan's interpretation of arm's length principle has a slightly different feature that; the organisation has an independent corporate status, and uses expert advisory panels for decision-making⁵⁰, but should be administering by government bureaucrats who are on-loan (*shukko*) from the Ministry. R. Fisher points out that it cannot be regarded as *arm's length* body. According to Wolferen, “journalists and academics, moreover, wrongly apply Western social, political and economic concepts in discussing their society.

4-1 THE STRUCTURE OF BUREAUCRACY IN JAPAN

Morita points out three characteristic features of Japanese bureaucracy⁵¹.

1. Personnel administration
2. Sub-system around administrative structure
3. Definitive ministers

“Personnel administration” is represented by elite civil servants, so called as “Career”, and each ministry has a slightly different system. The National Personnel Authority (*Jjini-in*) recruits freshmen every year collectively by examination, but their assignment is delegated to each ministry. A civil servant is once assigned to a ministry, he or she will continue working within same ministry until his or her retirement and *amakudari*.

The second point, sub-system around administrative structure” will be considered in the later part of the paper. With regard to “definitive ministers”, this is the way of “ministerial administration” is common in Denmark, Norway, and Iceland, as Hannesson describes⁵², and means that the decisive power is in each minister. However, many must raise an objection. Estebeth points out about the Japan's case as follows;

In case of Japan, the Diets as a legislative organ have become a dead letter, and legislative function is owned by civil servants. In addition, the bureaucracy has not allowed ministers to interrupt their personnel administration as a system⁵³.

There is a slightly different from “two-tier system” in Sweden. In Japan, because of independence of each ministry - not independent institution under the ministry, power of minister interfering his or her ministry is limited. If “decisive minister” could function properly, there might be no need for *Kozo Kaikaku*, structuring reform, by the Koizumi Administration.

This is partly explained by concept of personnel system of civil servants, which is represented by “delayed promotion” and “deferred compensation”. It means the personnel system control and guarantee civil servants’ lives from their assignment and promotion until retirement and *amakudari*. This creates a strong cohesive power to his or her belonging ministry and its independence. Because of its strong cohesive power to the ministry, the bureaucracy tries to keep its independence even from the Minister, as its master.

“Delayed promotion” and “deferred compensation” are based on Japanese system of employment. But in particular in public administration it functions that recruiting talented young people with lower wage than private corporations, and fostering them with continuous competitions among themselves for promotion, without harming their incentive.

The problem with personnel administration is mainly job-rotation of civil servants, especially career. They move their position almost every two-year. It means their knowledge and speciality in a particular area must be limited. However, for career bureaucrats, it is crucial for their promotion.

4-2 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND BUREAUCRACY IN THE ARTS

In Japan, a main authority for cultural policy and arts management is the Agency for Cultural Affairs (*Bunka-cho*) under the Ministry of Education and Science (*Monbu Kagaku-sho*). But several ministries have been concerning the area, such as Ministry of International Trade and Industries (*Keizai Sangyo-sho*), Ministry of General Affairs (*Somu-sho*), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Gaimu-sho*), Ministry of Health and Labour (*Kosei Rodo-sho*) and so on. In addition, the Japanese context adds many independent institutions (*tokushu hojin*) and too many foundations (*zaidan hojin*) under each ministry - although these organisations should be independent from public administration in principle, through on-loan and *amakudari*, these are very important for job security of bureaucrats.

The paper would like to discuss the Ministry of Education and Science and especially the Agency for Cultural Affairs, in term of specialist and speciality.

As of April 2002, there are 4 arts and cultural researchers (*geijutsu bunka chosakan*) and 3 specialists (*senmonkan*) in the Agency for Cultural Affairs, except cultural heritage experts, which have a different recruitment and personnel system. In 2000, the Ministry of Education has 137,782 civil servants and 1,352 among 137,782 worked within the Ministry and 218 civil servants worked in the Agency for Cultural Affairs, although in fiscal 2001 a large scale of reform of public administration merging with the Agency for Science and Technology took place. It may clarify the number of “specialists” in authorities is fairly limited. However, these specialist positions are not defined by legislation⁵⁴.

The Organisational Regulations of the Ministry of Education and Science (*Monbu Kagaku-sho Soshiki Kisoku*) define two categories of specialist post in term of performing arts, as follows;

Stage Technical Specialist (Butai Gijutsu Senmonkan) is responsible to researching, instructing and advising special technical matters of performing arts.

Specialist of Supporting Arts and Cultural Activities (Geijutsu Bunka Katsudo Shien Senmonkan) is responsible to researching, instructing and advising special matters of private supports for arts and cultural activities.

However, within the Agency for Cultural Affairs, there is only a civil servant having the latter post of specialist (as of April 2002), and the others do not have any justification by not only legislation but also its own regulations. Some civil servants working as specialists (*senmonkan*) have qualification of graduate school on arts and culture, and some have working experience as a researcher at Tokushu Hojin such as at the National Theatre. However, the others are genuine bureaucrats who do not have any qualification in the arts and culture, but public administration or law, and has been working in a line and staff posts. In short, the post *senmonkan* does not concern its holder's qualification and speciality.

It must be considered differences between accumulation of knowledge in a specified area from his or her post, and "specialists". However, in a generalist society of Japan, it may be difficult to define what the specialists are in the organisation (job-description) and how to reward them.

In fiscal 1998, the Agency of General Affairs (of the date) proposed the reform of civil servant system, and showed its point of view on fostering specialists. Judging from its proposition, it is clarified its intention and convention for training generalist to being specialists within public administration rather than recruiting qualified specialists. The proposition insisted on the importance of non-routine highly specified tasks in public administration, however, there was no vision for recruiting qualified specialists from private sectors.

In fiscal 2000, however, the government introduced a new system for contracting specialists with tenure. Its aims are to secure talented human resources from private sector into public administration smoothly, and to employ them without any disadvantages in their term. As of the end of fiscal 2000, the government contracted only 19 persons and there is no specialist of this category within the Agency for Cultural Affairs.

How do we define specialists on the arts and culture depends on how to clarify job-description of the arts and culture in public administration. Public administration cannot be judged by a technique - to some extents, performers could be. It is difficult task to define "talent" in value judgement, although it is possible to judge "knowledge" by examination.

In the background of lack of specialists in the Agency, according to Neki, former senior bureaucrat of the Agency, there is a definite reason.

As a system ensuring the principle of non-intervening contents⁵⁵, with regard to decision-making about arts and cultural activities, we have a system delegating decision-makings into independent advisory panels of experts... Although there are many problems with the process of policy-making in cultural policy, as far as reviewing and evaluating arts and cultural activities, the Agency delegates its decision-makings to the panels... Under the Advisory Committee for Promotion of Cultural Policy (*Bunka Seisaku Suishin Kaigi*), peer panels discusses and drafts the original plans, and with the approval by the Advisory Committee for Promotion of Cultural Policy, the Agency for Cultural Affairs employs the plans as these stand. There is no room for the Agency intervening the plans. Only specialists' view reflect its final decisions⁵⁶.

It is to say that; as the Agency for Cultural Affairs delegates overall decision-makings in term of "contents" to expert panels, there is no need to have many specialists within its public administration. However, there is no definite information on criteria available for not only selecting specialists as panel, but also their decision-

makings. Who are in the panels are normally opened to the public. But there is no way for them commenting their decision-makings. What is cleared is these experts do not represent any organisation or industry, and they just participate as a qualified professional citizen, like the British Arts Councils.

“Sub-system around administrative structure”, which was raised in the previous section, has not been considered yet. In considering public administration, it is important to examine related industries as beneficiaries of public service.

Sub-system of overall public administration structure includes not only inside civil servants but also groups of beneficiary of its service. Then it creates a sort of community⁵⁷.

As an overall public administration and its advisory panels, it has been severely criticised by the general public and journalisms, in term of adhesion between bureaucrats and particular interest groups, which have political influence; fixation of beneficiaries of public service; secrecy of formation of advisory panel and of discussions at advisory panel⁵⁸.

In the field of the arts and culture, and cultural policy, it is important to understand the existence of another community, “*sokatsu dantai*”, representative body of each art form or profession. As of April 2002, there are 60 *sokatsu dantai* under the umbrella of the Agency for Cultural Affairs. Any private arts organisation cannot apply any subsidy programme to the Agency for Cultural Affairs without through *sokatsu dantai*, or through local authorities. Each *sokatsu dantai* is a window for arts organisation to apply and sort out the applications, and submits to the Agency. This could be regarded as a result of long-term administrative guidance (*gyosei shido*), which promoted each arts profession or art form systematise an organisation⁵⁹ representing them as profession or art form. But more directly, it was launched in 1978, when the Agency for Cultural Affairs formulated funding criteria for its main programme, the Agency requested the industries to set up an association so called *Josei-kai* and subsidised to *Josei-kai* collectively. In turn, *Josei-kai* re-distributes to each body of profession or art form.

“Administrative guidance” may be a peculiar in Japan, but is explained that government authorities, without having any legislative power, advise or persuade local governments or private organisations and corporations, in order to achieve its administrative objectives⁶⁰. Wakiyama, former bureaucrat for the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, points out the problems with administrative guidance that; there are cases for the recipient to have no alternative choice without obeying it although it does not have any legislative power; and there are cases which cannot distinguish “informal” personal comment or action of the bureaucrat from “formal” administrative wills of authority⁶¹. Their in-responsible and personal comments without having considered in depth, have been swaying not only private sectors but also local governments.

Each *sokatsu dantai* is responsible to deal with all applicants equally, even some are not members under its umbrella. However, it is difficult for outsiders to have detailed funding information. It is also difficult for *sokatsu dantai*, which must consider its membership at the first place, to some extents, even if the organisation were non-profit public interest association or foundation. It totally depends on good common sense or awareness of the public of each *sokatsud dantai*.

From this, we may be able to say that there are some similarities with the Arts Council of Finland. Although in the British Arts Council, all members of the Council and panels are individuals, not representatives from any industrial bodies or professions, in the Finnish model, each art form has its own arts council, and all members of the Councils and panels are representatives from interest groups and industries⁶². In short, in Britain, the arts

councils' decision-making are independent from interest groups and industries - of course, there might be some negotiation, and on the other hand, in Finland, the arts councils' decision-making reflected views of interest groups and industries including trade unions - it may be a reflection of social and political background of welfare state and its employment policy.

We may be able to regard that the Agency for Cultural Affairs of Japan, to some extents, delegates value-judgement or assessment on the arts to each sokatsu dantai. It is supporting "principle of non-intervening contents", and to some extents can be highly regarded. However, there are some abuses in this system.

Whether or not the administration of each sokatsu dantai, or the re-distribution or usage of the subsidy through each sokatsu dantai, are accountable. There are some sokatsu dantai do not have corporate status, and it is difficult for the Agency to examine the usage of money distributed to sokatsu dantai, although many of them have non-profit public interest association or foundation.

There is a good example illustrating this problem. On 22 November 2000, the Diets passed huge amount of supplementary budget for the arts and culture. Arts organisations applied to the Agency for Cultural Affairs through their sokatsu dantai, in order to have a piece of the pie. One of the problems was that most people were not known about the distribution of supplementary budget to arts organisations - most sokatsu dantai informed their members only.

However, there was no way for most sokatsu dantai redistributing the information to outsiders.

For example, a sokatsu dantai set a closing date of application on 15 December 2000, and submitted to the Agency for Cultural Affairs. And within the year, the Agency for Cultural Affairs notified the results to arts organisations through sokatsu dantai.

Needless to say, it is doubtful that the Agency for Cultural Affairs and their advisory panels examined all applications properly in term of quality, policy, and accountability.

The problems with sub-system of administrative structure of public administration in the arts, in other words, the relationship between the bureaucrats and the industries. have not been discussed because the pie for the Agency for Cultural Affairs was so small in comparison with other ministries.

In December 2001, the Basic Promoting Law for Culture and the Arts was passed in the Diets⁶³, and then the industries and academics started to request creating another arts council with specialists, which is completely independent from the politics.

As we have discussed and clarified in this paper, the arts council, which is independent from the politics and run by specialists, has many fundamental problems. Apart from these problems, in the circumstance of traditional strong bureaucracy and structuring reform of the government in order to recover ministerial administration, it may be so difficult to ensure its independence.

In Japan, non-profit public interest associations and foundations have been established with the approval of their competent government authorities, and the government authorities have established or exclusively approved these organisations for their interest rather than the public interest. These organisations (*koeki hojin*) have been functioning, to some extents, as a semi-governmental organ. How can new arts council escape from these conventions?

Arts council with arm's length principle is not a democratic, as we discussed in the case of Britain. Currently citizens' participation in the politics, public administration and others are strong requirements from the citizens of Japan. How can it be justified? - Unfortunately, we cannot say that the arts have been duly accepted and appreciated by the general public of Japan.

Also it is important to wonder and examine the possibility creating new type of arts bureaucrats who will have a strong power in the arts but are not responsible to the general public. If an independent arts council were

established with the basis of the Basic Promoting Law, cultural and artistic lives of the people might be defined by arts bureaucrats who are not responsible to the general public. “Openness”, or public scrutiny, which is common in Swedish society, must be considered here. According to Dahl, “it is not the same that delegating subordinate decisions to experts with delegating exclusive administrative decision to experts”⁶⁴.

5 SWEDEN - CONSIDERING THE COMPARISON WITH JAPAN

The five countries of northern Europe, commonly referred to as Scandinavia or the Nordic Countries, are usually regarded as social democratic states with high standards of social welfare. However, as a matter of fact, these countries are classified into two categories in term of public administration. While Denmark as well as Norway and Iceland developed “*ministerial administration*” where the minister has the possibility to control the whole of his or her area of operation, Sweden developed her public administration into a *two-tier system*, consisting of the Ministries at one level and the central administration institution at another⁶⁵. Administrative institutions in Sweden obey to the government as an organisation or group, but they are not situated under the Minister⁶⁶. In practice, in Denmark the Minister sits as a head of the Ministry, as well as is a cabinet member as a final decision-maker. Consequently the Minister in Denmark has the possibility to be scrutinised by ombudsman of the Denmark Congress. On the other hand, in Sweden, the Parliament cannot scrutinise any cabinet members. However, it does not mean that the Swedish Parliament is less powerful. It is obvious that elected politicians at the Parliament are stronger than the Cabinet and bureaucrats.

Image with the welfare state is associated with the large government with extraordinary high tax rate and public expenditure, and with large bureaucratic structure. However, in the field of the arts, the bureaucrats consist of this two-tier system is remarkably small. The reason why is, even the centralised institutions have been decentralised and devoted into regional and local authorities. At the same time, as there are a few legislations in the field of cultural policy, except copyright and cultural heritage protection, even arts and cultural activities have been largely sustained and controlled by legislations on labours⁶⁷. Although data are no updated, two major departments of cultural affairs employed only about 30 people⁶⁸. The permanent staff of the National Cultural Council, a pair for the Ministry in two-tier system, employed only 55⁶⁹. In two-tier system, the former two departments deal with policy-making and budgeting, on the other hand, the latter is responsible to executing the policy. The National Cultural Council has executive committee within the organisation, and is responsible to the Cabinet, not the Minister. There are a number of centralised institutions in any field of Sweden, and the independence of these institutions is stressed and if a minister is thought to unduly exercise his or her influence, this is seen as putting the “independence” of the institution in jeopardy⁷⁰.

In addition to this two-tier system, in order to understand, it is necessary to consider the strong partnership among the public administration, employers and employees (trade unions), so called “social corporatism”. For the purpose of policy-making, the public administration admitted the participations of representatives from the other two sectors⁷¹. In context of this paper, this can be regarded as a participation of experts or specialists into policy-making, and three sectors make a community together.

For instance, Hannesson describes the process of policy-making and the involvement of specialists as follows.

1. The parliament or ministry appoints a committee to investigate the prerequisites of and prepare a new policy.
2. The committee is given directives for their work from parliament or a ministry.
3. They do extensive research into the background of the subject and make draft proposals.

4. They send their proposals to various persons and/or organisations (could be arts organisations, artists' unions, copyright associations etc.) to have their reaction and perhaps criticism.
5. After receiving the reactions they put the document together, taking into account the reactions. Following that, they draw conclusions, summarise and present their proposal for policy.
6. The committee publishes their report in a special government series.
7. The report is used to present / prepare a bill in parliament or to issue a government policy⁷².

Hannesson refers that the Swedish bureaucracy favours the involvement of specialists⁷³, it may testify that there is a community around public administration in Sweden, too. However, Japanese sokatsu dantai do not cover majority of arts organisations and artists, and - it must be crucial - do not include trade unions, while Swedish covers the most. In Sweden, over 80% of labours is systematised and centralised⁷⁴. This is a fruit of trade union movement and social democracy in the past. On the other hand, in Japan, a series of *Gyosei Shido* (governmental guidance) have promoted artists to organise an association representing their profession or art form, instead of trade union. However, the lack of trade union is not only caused by gyosei shido but also an important fact - in not a few arts organisation, there is no boundary between employees and employers.

For example, the Association for Japanese Theatrical Companies, which is a representative body for mainstream theatre companies, cannot separate the employees (actors and directors) from the employers (managers). The Japanese contemporary theatres have developed through actors' cooperative bodies, and they employed their administrators. Also it may be important to note that most companies do not contract with actors with monthly or fixed wage.

But it must be more serious that there is no boundary between professionals and amateurs - in this sense, self-appointed professionals could be regarded as professionals. Partly this can be regarded as "flexibility", which creates vitality and dynamism in the arts, however, it means that artists cannot be supported by the labour laws - although Japan's labour laws have not regarded freelance workers or self-employed, as labours or workers. This has been causing serious problems in various aspects.

When approaching the subjects of cultural policy and arts management, historical, social and cultural backgrounds must be considered properly.

Japanese cultural policy and arts management have been developing without concerning employment and professionalisation of artists. This reflects in our funding system as well that; not only government funding but also private subsidies do not allow any arts organisations to use the subsidies for their operating cost which includes wages for their employee or members of the companies, except for some orchestras run by local authorities. On the other hand, in Sweden, because of labour legislations, funding only covers fixed cost (or part thereof), such as wages of contracted employees⁷⁵. This difference must be one of clues for our comparative study of cultural policy and arts management in term of bureaucracy in the arts between Japan and Sweden.

In facilitator model, arts managers always think about raising money from private purse, and in architect model, arts managers peep into bureaucrats' faces. Arts manager in any country always thinks about the financial stability for his or her arts organisations, with sustaining artistic freedom and quality. Japanese arts managers may always think how to cover their operating costs from the resources available from project funding, and on the other hand, Swedish managers may think as follows;

The situation can sometimes leave the Swedish arts manager in the absurd situation that in order not to run into deficit, it is better to pay the musicians their regular wages and not have any concerts or rehearsals, which usually cause extra costs over and above the income the activities generate!

What is crucial is how “*Administrators*” see this reality.

What cultural policy sees, for whom cultural policy functions, by whom cultural policy is executed, and where its responsibility lies; and under the circumstance how arts organisations and arts managers are influenced... there are so many points we have to continue arguing and examining with various viewpoints. International comparative studies give us plural alternative views, which re-examine the system we accepted as a matter of course. This is a value of international comparative studies

Notes

¹ F.F.Ridley (1987): “*Tradition, Change and Crisis in Great Britain*”, compiled for “the Patron State - Government and the Arts in Europe, North America and Japan”, Oxford University Press, p.225

² Karel van Wolferen (1990): “*The Enigma of Japanese Power*”, Vintage

³ Clive Gray (2000): “*The Politics of The Arts in Britain*”, St. Martin’s Press, p.5

⁴ Harry H. Chartrand (1989): “*The Arm’s Length Principle and the Arts: An International Perspective - Past, Present and Future*” in Minton C. Cumming Jr. and J. Mark Davidson Schuster (eds): “*Who’s to pay for the Arts*”, ACA Books

⁵ Haukur F. Hannesson (1998), *Symphony Orchestras in Scandinavia and Britain - A Comparative Study of Funding, Cultural Models and Chief Executive Self-Perception of Policy and Organisation*, PhD Thesis, City University, p.202

⁶ *ibid.*, p.204

⁷ *ibid.*, p.204

⁸ Augustin Girard (1987): “*The Ministry of Culture*” in *the Arts Politics, Power and the Purse*, An International Conference on the Structure of Arts Funding, Arts Council of Great Britain, pp.8-12

⁹ Robert Wangermee (1991): *Cultural Policy in France*, European Programme for the Appraisal of Cultural Policies, Council of Europe, p.33

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p.34

¹¹ See David Bradby & Annie sparks (1997): “*Mise en Scene - French Theatre Now*”, Methuen, p.15 and others.

¹² *ibid.*, pp12-16

¹³ Marc Fumaroli (1991): “*L’Etat Culturel - Une religion moderne*”, Japanese translation, 1993, pp.67-70

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p.70

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p.68

¹⁶ Hiroaki Inatsugu (1996): “*Personnel System of Bureaucracy in Japan*”, p.67, Toyo Keizai Shinpo-sha

¹⁷ Robert Wangermee (1991): “*Cultural Policy in France*”, European Programme for the Appraisal of Cultural Policies, p. 191, Council of Europe

¹⁸ William Safran (1991): “*The French Policy*”, third edition, p.206, Longman

¹⁹ *ibid.*, p.205

²⁰ Robert Wangermee (1991), p.29

²¹ The Rockefeller Panel Report, 1965

²² William Safran (1991), pp.200-201

²³ Hiroaki Inatsugi (1996), p.68

²⁴ Ritva Mitchell & Rod Fisher (1992): “*Professional Managers for the Arts and Culture?*”, pp.51-52, Council of Europe

²⁵ David Bradby & Annie Sparks (1997): “*Mise en Scene - French Theatre Now*”, p.13, Methuen.

²⁶ See Claude Mollard (1984): “*Le Mythe de Babel L’Artiste et le Systeme*”. This is written by a senior bureaucrat of the Ministry of Culture under the Lang regime. The Japanese translation, although it is pains-taking works, has a problem with terminology. As the translators who are specialists on French literature, their wordings are not always appropriate in term of public administration, cultural policy, and arts management.

²⁷ Claude Mollard (1984), Japanese translation (2001), pp.95-96

- ²⁸ Patrick Devaux (1993): “*La Comedie-Francaise*”, Que sais-je?, p.108, Presses Universitaires de France
- ²⁹ Janet O. Minihan (1977), “*The Nationalization of Culture - The development of state subsidies to the arts in Great Britain*”, New York University Press
- ³⁰ John Pick (1988): “*The Arts in a State - A study of government arts policies from Greece to the Present*”, p.xi, Bristol Classical Press
- ³¹ F. F. Ridley (1987), p.225
- ³² Clive Gray(2000), p.41
- ³³ Lord Redcliffe-Maud (1976): “*Supporting for the Arts in England and Wales - A report to the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation,*” p.24, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation
- ³⁴ Haukur F. Hannesson (1998), p.69
- ³⁵ Janet Oppenheim Minihan (1977), p.230
- ³⁶ See John Pick (1988), “*Managing the Arts?*”, and “*Ville Jelly*” (1991).
- ³⁷ Canada Council (1985): “*The Arm’s Length Principle and the Arts: an International Perspective-Past, Present and Future*”, Research & Evaluation.
- ³⁸ Haukur F. Hannesson (1998)
- ³⁹ Rod Fisher (1987): “*The Arts: Politics, Power and the Purse*”, a conference paper, the Arts Council of Britain
- ⁴⁰ *ibid.*
- ⁴¹ See Andrew SINCLAIR (1995), *Arts and Cultures - The History of the 50 Years of the Arts Council of Great Britain*, Sinclair-Stevenson; and Hugh JENKINS (1979), *The Culture Gap - An Experience of Government and the Arts*, Marion Boyars.
- ⁴² John Pick (1988), p.95
- ⁴³ Lord Redcliffe-Maud (1976): *Support for the Arts in England and Wales - A report to the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation*, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, p.25
- ⁴⁴ Martin Pugh (1994), “*State and Society - British Political & Social History 1870 - 1992*”, p.240, Arnold.
- ⁴⁵ Steven C. Dubin (1979): *Bureaucratizing the Muse - Pubic Funds and the Cultural Worker*, University of Chicago Press, p.xiii
- ⁴⁶ Eric W. White (1977): “*The Arts Council of Great Britain*”, pp.55-56, Davis-Poynter
- ⁴⁷ Malcolm Griffiths (1977), The Drama Panel Game, an Inside View of the Arts Council, *Theatre Quarterly*, Vol. VII. No.25, p.3
- ⁴⁸ Frank Marcus (1977), Two Years of Sheer Frustration, *Theatre Quarterly*, Vol. VII, No.27, p.91
- ⁴⁹ See Akira Neki (2000) and others.
- ⁵⁰ The expert advisory panel was firstly introduced in 1939 when the Film Law was passed in the Diets. It was a precursor in term of the system, however, because of its aim and objective of the government of the day, its value was lost.
- ⁵¹ Akira Morita (2000): “*Modern Public Administration (Gendai no Gyosei)*”, revised edition, pp.104-105, Hoso Daigaku
- ⁵² Haukur Hannesson (2001): “Public Administration of the Arts - Cultural policy, its implementation and structure in Sweden (*Geijutsu no gyosei*)”, papar for the research, translated into Japanese, *Theatre & Policy*, Theatre Planning Network
- ⁵³ Nihon Keikaku Gyosei Gakkai (1999), “*Inside the Japanese Bureaucracy (Chuo-shocho no seisaku keisei katei)*”, p.23, Chuo University Press
- ⁵⁴ Research Committee on Civil Servants System, 20th meeting, 30th June 1998
- ⁵⁵ There is no equivalent wording in English.
- ⁵⁶ Akira Neki (2000): “*Japanese Cultural Policy (Nihon no Bunka Seisaku)*”, p.27, Keiso Shobo
- ⁵⁷ Akira Morita (2000), p.104
- ⁵⁸ Yoichi Ohashi (2001): “*Administrative Law and Process (Gyosei Ho)*”, p.227, Yuhikaku
- ⁵⁹ It is important to note here that the Musicians Union of Japan, the Japan Actors Union, and the Association for Japanese Theatre Companies for Children and Young People are not entitled as sokatsu dantai. Although the Agency did not clarify its reason, it may be caused by their social standings; these organisations are trade unions or cooperative bodies. For example, the Japan Actors Union is not trade union by legislation, but a cooperative body of professional actors having a collective

agreement, was established in 1967, with the approval of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. See “Japan Actors Union its 30th History” (2002), pp.55-57

⁶⁰ Takashi Wakiyama (1994): “*Reform of Bureaucracy Drafted by Bureaucrats (Kanryo ga kaita Kanryo Kaikaku)*”, p.136, Sanno Daigaku Shuppankai

⁶¹ *ibid.*, pp.137-138

⁶² Ritva Mitchell (2001): “Finland”, compiled for “*Cultural policies in Europe: a compendium of basic facts and trends*”, Council of Europe.

⁶³ A major problem with the Basic Promoting Law was that; most general public did not know this legislation, and many thought the discussion was not enough and showed their wills of refusal.

⁶⁴ Robert A. Dahl (1998): “*On Democracy*”, Japanese translation (2001) by Takafumi Nakamura, p.96 Iwanami Shoten.

⁶⁵ Haukur F. Hannesson (2001), “*Public Administration of the Arts*”, translated into Japanese, for Theatre & Policy No.10

⁶⁶ Olof Petersson (1995), “*The Government and Politics of the Nordic Countries*”, Japanese translation (1995), p.124, Waseda University Press

⁶⁷ Presentation by Dr. Hannesson, Tokyo, April 2002

⁶⁸ Prior to the establishment of the Ministry of Culture in 1993, Cultural affairs are (were) dealt with by two departments in the Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs, a Department of Cultural Affairs (for museums, theatre, dance, music, visual arts, grants to artists and the preservation of the cultural heritage) and a Department of Mass Media Policy (for film, publishing, broadcasting and the press).

⁶⁹ John Myerscough (1990): “*National Cultural Policy in Sweden - Report of a European group of experts*”, p.19, Council of Europe

⁷⁰ Haukur F. Hannesson (2001).

⁷¹ Yasuo Baba & Kenji Hirajima (2000), “*European Political Handbook (Yoroppano Seiji Handbook)*”, p.207, University of Tokyo Press

⁷² A note prepared by Hannesson for the paper, July 2002

⁷³ *ibid.*

⁷⁴ Yasuo Baba & Kenji Hirajima (2000), p.207

⁷⁵ Haukur F. Hannesson, a note prepared in January 2002